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In the Supreme Court 
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w. A. NIELSON, I 
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SMITH, E. LINCOLN SMITH, POLLY 
SliiTH, JOHN "\V. SMITH and MAX 
GAILEY, Trustees of the Smith Land No.6199 
Company, and SMITH LAND · COM-
p Al\TY, a Corporation, 
· Defendants and Appellants. 
ALBERTS. WHEELWRIGHT, Trustee 
in Bankruptcy of John ·w. Smith, 
Bankrupt, Intervenor and Respondent, 
AND 
S~IITH ~1) CO:MP ANY, a Cor-
poration, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
:M: M. JOHNSON, Receiver of Nielson- No. 6198 
Burton Company, Formerly a Co-Part-
nership, Composed of A. J., Nielson and 
Pharles . S. Burton, CHARLES D. 
'MOORE,'WILS~ A. NIELSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Brief of Respondents W. A. Nielson, and 
Albert S. Wheelwright Trustee in Bank· 
~ptcy of John W. Smith, Bankrupt 
We ·have carefully examined and considered 
the so-ealled statement of facts which covers the 
first thirteen pages of appellants' brief. As we 
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view it, the issues in these cases are clear cut and 
simple. The so-called statement of facts as s.et out 
is very argumentative, confusing and we think mis-
leading and is not a statement but rather an at-
tempted justification of the deliberate and studied 
plan and purpose of John W. Smith to defraud his 
creditors and his studied acts in carrying out this 
purpose. 
The two cases present but one issue, that is, 
did the acts of John W. Smith in transferring his 
property amount in law to a transfer in fraud of 
creditors and incidentally was the cause of action 
resulting from such acts barred by the statute of 
limitations and further as incidental to the main 
issue, does the decree rendered herein conform to 
the established practice in such cases 1 With this 
general observation, we shall briefly state the fact~ 
as presented by the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1930 John W. Smith was the owner of 
approximately 473 acres of land in Box Elder 
County and 180 shares of the stock of the Pocatello 
Valley Pipe Line Company and some other prop·-
erty, subject to an obligation to pay the balance 
of the purchase price of the land. The property 
stood of record in Box Elder County in the name 
of the seller, the contract of sale having been enter-
ed into by M. M. Johnson as receiver of Nielson-
Burton Company, a co-partnership. 
In 1929 Wilse A. Nielson recovered a judgment 
against John W. Smith in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in the amount of $1278.92, 
which judgment was docketed in the District Court 
of Box Elder County on September 14, 1929. On 
~fay 22, 1930, the City Court at Brigham City en-
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tered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, vVilse A. 
Nielson, and against John \V. Smith for $54.90. 
On the 16th day of .. :-\.ugust, 1930, the District 
Court for Box Elder County entered a judgment 
in favor of Bertha K. Skeen against John vV. Smith 
for the sum of $100.00, being a judgment for costs 
awarded on the affirmance by this Court of a pre-
vious judgmE>nt by the Di.::trict Court for Box Elder 
County. This latter judgment was, prior to the 
filing of the instant case, assigned by Bertha K. 
Skeen to \\ibe ~\.. Nielson and at the time of the 
filing of this complaint, \\ilse A. Nielson was the 
owner of all three judgments. This case, being rP-
ferred to as the Box Elder case, was filed in the 
District Court for Box Elder County on July 9, 
1935. 
On October 5, 1935, John W. Smith filed a vol-
untary petition in bankruptcy listing certain assets, 
but not listing the real estate or water stock in 
question. In his schedules John W. Smith, bank-
rupt, liRted as his only creditors Bertha K. Skeen 
and Wilse A. Xielson, the plaintiff in this case, and 
listed as the only claims against hip! the three 
judgments above described. These judgments 
appear in his schedules as certified by the bank-
ruptcy court to this Court in support of a motion to 
abate, at page 022 of the transcript as follows: 
:Name of \Vh{'re and Name and 
CrPCiitors and \Yh~n Nature of Amount 
Addresses •Contracted Debt --~~~~--~-~~~~~-!------------ ------
·W. A. Nielson. Brigham City 
Tremonton Utah. · 
Utah. May 22, 1930 
Judg!ffi.ent 
entered in 
City Court. 
.Judgme.nt 
Bertha K. Skeen. Brigham City, entered in 
Salt Lake. City, Utah. District Court 
187 A Street August 16, 1930. Judgment made 
W. A. Nielson, Salt Lake. an~ enter~d. in 
Tremonton 'County Third JudiCial 
Utah. · i Sent. 29. 192!). 1 District. Salt 
1 •Lake County 
$ 54.90 
$ 100.00 
$1278.92 
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An adjudication in bankruptcy was immediate-
ly made and Albert S. Wheelwright, intervenor, 
was duly elected trustee in bankruptcy and im-
mediately qualified and entered upon his duties as 
such. In 1930 the judgments enumerated appeared 
on the judgment docket in Box Elder County. On 
October 7, 1930, after the said judgments were 
entered against him, John W. Smith caused the 
Smith Land Company to be incorporated with its 
principal place of business at Brigham City, Utah, 
and transferred all of the property then owned by 
him, including his rights in the real estate and water 
·stock above described to the Smith Land Com-
pany in full payment for the total 10,000 shares of 
its capital stock. The incorporators were all mem-
bers of the immediate family of John ·w. Smith. 
~heir names and the amount subscribed is as fol-
lows: 
John W. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000 
J. Cameron Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 
C. Vivian Smith .................. 1,700 
E. Lincoln Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 1,500 
Polly Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 1,000 
John W. Smith, trustee ........... 2,799 
Max Gailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
The contract to purchase the real estate here 
involved in which John W. Smith was buyer was 
assigned to the corporation but the assig11ment was 
not recorded in the office of the county recorder. 
The stock as taken by John W. Smith was, dis-
tributed around among members of his family. 
There was no apparent change of ownership of the 
real estate; there was no record change of the 
ownership and John W. Smith continued to occupy 
and operate the property consisting of a dry farm 
ranch, the same as before the assignment and up 
to the time of the filing of this action, taking crops 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
and rents therefrom and paying them on account 
of the balance of the purchase price. 
In 1931 the Sn1ith Land Company failed to pay 
the corporation tax and its charter was forfeited 
and continued as forfeited until after this action 
was filed, when it was reinstated. 
In the bankruptcy proceeding no property nor 
exemption was listed, and .AlbertS. ·Wheelwright a~ 
trustee, did not receive any money or other prop-
erty, but asserted the right to the real estate and 
all interests of John\\. Smith in it at the time the 
petition in bankruptcy was filed and claimed the 
right to administer that property as a part of the 
bankruptcy estate, to the exclusion of the bankrupt 
and the corporation. 
M. M. Johnson as receiver of Nielson-Burton 
had deeded the land, subject to the contract of sale 
with John W. Smith, to C. D. :Moore. C. D. Moore 
claimed the right, as agaj.nst John W. Smith and 
the Smith Land Company and WheelwrigliT as 
trustee, to forfeit this contract because of its de-
fault. 1'lilse A. Nielson, in order to protect against 
such forfeiture, purchased the rights of C. D. :Moore 
in the contract and in the land and the deed to the 
property was recorded in his name in Box Elder 
County. Succeeding to the rights of Johnson and 
'!foore, Wilse A. Nielson served notice of default 
'lpon the bankrupt, the Smith Land Company and 
Wheelwright. John VI/. Smith then, acting for him-
-~elf through the Smith Land Company, tendered to 
Wilse A. Nielson the balance of the purchase price 
and suit was filed in the name of Smith Land Com-
pany against Wilse A. Nielson, Moore, Johnson and 
others for a specific performance of the contract 
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of sale. This case will be referred to as the Salt 
Lake County case. 
Albert S. Wheelwright, claiming all the rights 
of John W. Smith, filed his complaint in inter-
vention in the Box Elder County case and the case 
was carried on by him as trustee· as originally filed 
by Nielson as a creditors bill. By stipulation the two 
cases were tried together but separate findings and 
decrees were entered in each case. In the Box Elder 
County case the trial court held and found and. 
decreed that the transfer of the real estate and all 
interest in it and the water stock of John W. Smith 
was made with the intention to hinder, delay and 
defraud his creditors and was therefore fraudulent 
and void. The court also determined the total 
amount then due on the three judgments owned and 
held by Nielson and determin~d that there was no 
money available to pay the costs of the bankruptcy 
proceeding and adjudged the total of these judg-
ments and the amount of costs in the bankruptcy 
court, to be a first and prior lien on the ·property 
in favor of Albert S. Wheelwright, as trustee in 
bankruptcy. The court further found that the 
rSmith Land Company was organized as a mere 
contrivance and instrumentality by John W. Smith 
to accomplish his fraudulent purpose and was his 
alter ego. In the Salt Lake County case the court 
decreed the conveyance of the property to John W. 
Smith and the Smith Land Company by Nielson, 
upon the payment to Nielson of the balance of the 
purchase price, but subject to the lien of the judg-
ment entered in the Box Elder County eas.e in the 
amount found to be the aggregate of all three judg-
ments held by Niel~on and the costs incurred in the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
We make brief reference to the pleadings as 
presenting the issues on this appeal. 
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PLEADINGS - BOX ELDER COUNTY CASE 
The complaint in the Box Elder County case, 
as amended, is the ordinary creditors bill. It 
alleges the entry and ownership of the judgments 
by the plaintiff, the ownership of the property by 
John W. Smith, the organization of the Smith Land 
Company by John ·"\V. Smith, to whom the property 
was transferred for 10,000 shares of stock of the par 
value of $1.00 per share, the lapse of the charter 
of the corporation during the year following its 
organization for failure to pay the corporation tax, 
the fact that the transfer to the corporation covered 
all property of the defendant, John ·w. Smith; that 
he was insolvent and that the transfer was made 
with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the cred-
itors of John W. Smith and that the corporation 
was holding the property in trust for John W. 
Smith and the plaintiff as his creditor; that the 
-property at all times stood in the name of the seller 
and there was no change in possession or use of 
the property and the plaintiff had no notice of the 
transfer and the fraud connected therewith until 
within three years prior to the filing of the plain-
tiff's action. 
The allegations of this complaint were adopted 
by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, Albert S. ·Wheel-
wright, who, under order of court, filed a compJaint 
in intervention and thereafter became the real 
plaintiff. 
The defendant, John W. Smith, by his answer 
as amended, admitted the entry of the judgments 
and as to one of them pleaded the statute of limita-
tions. He further admitted that execution had been 
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issued and was not satisfied. That he was one of 
th~ organizers of the Smith Land Company but de-
nied that it was organized or any transfer was made 
with intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. 
The other defendants, except the Smith Land Com-
pany, admitted the ownership of the property in 
John W. Smith and in effect denied all other alle-
gations. By an amended and supplemental an-
swer the Smith Land Company alleged, among 
other things, the ownership of the real estate in 
John W. Smith and his defaults under the contract 
to purchase and further alleged that after the 
plaintiff's complaint was filed, the corporation 
caused its charter to be reinstated and further al-
leged that if the plaintiff had any cause of action 
it was barred by limitation. 
The Smith Land Company further alleged 
that since the filing of the complaint, Nielson ac-
quired the ownership of the land and the eontract 
of sale from M. M. J-ohns.on and served notice of 
thEJ forfeiture of the SmitH Land Company, that 
the defendant company had tendered the balancp 
due on the contract and become entitled to a deed; 
that the defendant company had taken possession 
of the property and cultivated it and made many 
in~tallment payments to the seller and the plain-
tiff, Nielson, was estopped from denying the owner-
~hip of the property by the Smith Land Company. 
In its previous answer the company had alleged that 
ihe plaintiff and his attorney knew of the transfer 
of the property by Smith to the corporation at the 
tjme and more than three years prior to the in-
f,titution of the acHon. 
These affirmative allegations of the original 
and amended and S\lpplemental answer were denied 
in a reply by the plaintiff. 
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PLEADINGS - SALT LAI\:E COUNTY CASE 
The complaint of the Smith Land Company, 
as amended, is a simple complaint for specific per-
formance against M. ~I. Johnson, as the original 
party to the contract of sale, and his successors in 
jnterest, including " .. ilse A. Nielson in whom title 
was vested at the time the action was filed. The 
~~mended answer of "\Vilse A. Nielson admits the 
<;riginal contract and Jolm W. Smith, as purcahser, 
took possession under the contract and denies gen-
erally the other allegations of the complaint. Then, 
hy further answer, alleges the pendency of the Box 
Elder County case and states further generally 
the allegations of the complaint as amended in the 
Box Elder County case as above detailed. 
FINDINGS AND DECREE - BOX ELDER 
COUNTY CASE. 
The cases were consolidated for trial but sep-
arate findings and decree were entered. In the Box 
Elder County case the court found, on all of the 
material issues presented to the effect that John W. 
Smith was the owner of the property in 1930, sub-
ject to the balance of the purchas.e price, and that 
the judgments were entered as alleged and ad-
mitted by the defendants; that John W. Smith 
caused the corporation to be organized as a con-
trivance to be used in hindering, delaying and de-
frauding his creditors; and that after transferring 
his property to the corporation he was insolvent; 
that the effect was to hinder, delay and defraud his 
creditors, including the palintiff and that the cor-
poration had no separate existence but was his alter 
ego and that upon receiving the stock for the trans-
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fer of all of his property, the stock had been dis-
tributed, wholly without consideration, among the 
111embers of his family as a further step in his plan 
and purpose to hinder, delay and defraud his cred-
itors. That the prope·rty stood of record in the 
name of the seller and that no record of the trans-
fer of the property was made in the office of the 
county recorder and the plaintiff had no knowledge 
of the transfer, or any facts connected therewith 
until within three years prior to the filing of the 
action. That the plaintiff, Wilse A. Nielson, was 
the owner of all three judgments described in the 
complaint, aggregating in total the sum of $2529.36; 
that in the bankruptcy proceeding Albert S. Wheel-
wright was the Trustee in Bankruptcy o£ John W. 
Sn1ith and that Smith had caused to be deposited 
in the Salt Lake City case, as a tender, the balance 
of $2433.88 remaining unpaid on the purchase 
price; that title to the property and all interest of 
.John ·w. Smith therein passed to Albert S. Wheel-
wright, Trustee in Bankruptcy, subject to the home-
t:tead rights of John W. Smith. That Albe·rt S. 
Wheelwright, as such Trustee in Bankruptcy, had 
in due course of the bankruptcy proceedings offered 
for sale and sold to Aubrey F. Turley the said 
property and all rights of tTohn ·w. Smith therein 
and Aubrey F. Turley had paid therefor. That the 
plaintiff was the only creditor of John W. Smith 
listed or appearing in the bankruptcy proceeding; 
that ,John W. Smith had not paid the costs. of the 
said bankruptcy proceeding and there had accrued 
certain costs and expenses of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, to pay which there were no funds available. 
From this the court concluded that the Smith 
Land Company was organized as a vehicle or con-
trivance to be used and that it was used by John 
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W. Smith in hindering, delaying and defrauding his 
creditors; that the attempted transfer was fraud-
ulent and void to the extent that the property was 
n<.cessary to be applied to the complete satisfac-
tion of the said judg1nents and all costs incurred in 
ilie bankruptcy proceeding, for which: Albert S. 
·wheelwright becmne entitled to a judgment and 
first lien on the said property and the whole there-
of~ subject to the homestead exemption. The decree 
adjudged the assignment and transfer by John ,V. 
Smith to the Smith Land Company to be fraudulent 
and void and further that upon the payment of too 
balance of the purchase price, Albert S. ·Wheel-
wright was decreed to have a first and prior lien 
en the said property in the amount of $2529.36, be-
ing the amount of the judgment, with interest, and 
also for the additional amount of $1247.19 being the 
amount of costs and expenses as determined by 
the bankruptcy court in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing; and further decreeing that the judgment bel 
satisfied upon the payment, within 60 days, of the 
said amounts, in default of which Albert S. Wheel-
wright would become entitled to proceed to foreclose 
his lien upon the said property. 
FINDINGS AND DECREE - SALT LAKE 
COUNTY CASE. 
In the Salt Lake County case the court made 
findings on aU material issues, following, in effect, 
the findings in the other case, as above detailed, and 
the court then concluded that Wilse A. Nielson, up-
on the payment to him of the balance of the pur-
chase price, as tendered, should execute a deed as 
cal1ed for by the contract, to John W. Smith and 
the Smith Land Company and upon delivery of the 
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t:ame, with abstract and water stock, to the county 
clerk, the clerk was directed to deliver the check 
i c:Ht_lciTd and held by him to vVilse A. Nielson. The 
court in this ca:::;e decreed the property to be con-
veyed ::-;ubject to the lien as fixed and determined 
~nd decreed in the Box Elder County case. 
ARGUMENT 
Twenty-two assignments of error are printed 
1n the appellants' abstract. In the brief, appel-
lants discuss only part of these assignments of 
error and group them under five separate heads. 
Under the rule of this Court, we assurne that all 
assig11ments of error not included in the argument 
in appellants' brief are waived and we shall give 
no attention to them. 
' The fundamental question presented by this 
appeal is the effect of a transfer by an insolvent 
debtor of all of his property to a corporation, or-
ganized by him where he takes in exchange all of 
it~ stock, as against the rights of existing creditors. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
The eases on this subject are rathe,r numerous, 
and the majority of them hold, with very little qual-
ification, that where a debtor transfers his property 
to a corporation in consideration of the stock of the 
eorporation, and receives no other consideration for 
the transfer except the stock of the corporation, 
the transfer may be considered as fraudulent and 
may be set aside or the property reached in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
hands of the corporation by the creditors of the 
debtor so making the transfer. 
A leading case on the subject, and a well con-
sidered case, is the case of 
First National Bank v. F. C. Trebein Com-
pany, an Ohio case reported in 52 
N.E. 83-±. 
In that case Trebein formed a corporation which 
was called the F. C. Trebein Company. Prior to 
the forming of this corporation, Trebein had been 
carrying on a business of buying, selling and mill-
ing grain, and in that business he owned two or 
three mills, elevators, considerable real estate and 
water rights and capital stocks and other personal 
property. His personal financial affairs came to 
be somewhat involved and he learned that he was 
going to become further liable on outstanding notes 
which he had endorsed personally for another com-
pany. This condition existed in the latter part of 
the year 1894. In December of 1894 and January 
of 1895, Trebein conveyed real and personal prop-
erty to his wife to the value of over $40,000.00, 
claiming it was in part payment of a prior indebt-
edness due to the wife. He also transferred real 
estate of the value of $2100.00 to his daughter, 
claiming it was a fulfillment of a promise of a wed-
1ding gift he had made some six months previous. 
He also pledged a large amount of corporate stocks 
to his wife as collateral for a balance of $8700.00 
which he claimed was due her over and above the 
$40,000.00. The transfer of such property to his 
wife and daughter was not involved in the particular 
ca8e reported, the Court merely stating that an-
other action was pendingt with regard to those 
transfers. After such transfers the defendant, Tre-
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bein, owned real estate and milling property worth 
somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000. On Jan_ 
uary 22, 1895, he formed a corporation, incorporated 
for $60,000, with 600 shares of a par value of 
$100.00 each, and conveyed all of his property to 
the corporation except that which he had previously 
transferred to his wife and daughter. The·re was 
some question whether the property transferred to 
the corporation was actually wo!th $60,000.00 or 
not, but no point was made of that by the court. 
Of the 600 shares issued upon the incorporation 
of the F. C. Trebein Company, Trebein himself took 
596 shares. One share each was issued to his wife, 
his daughter, a son-in-law and a brother-in-law, each 
of whom paid' $90.00 a share for the one share of 
stock delivered to them. Of the 596 shares issued 
'to Trebein, he retained one share and p~edg1ed the 
balance to three banks as security for notes cover-
ing obligations which the banks had previously held 
against him. 
The same contention was made in that case as 
was made by the defendant, John W. Smith, in this 
case; that is, that his sole intent and purpose in 
forming the corporation was to try and protect his 
creditors, and he attempted to prove his. point by 
showing that he had pledged practically all of the 
Rtcck to his creditors on their obligations. The 
same argument was made by John ·w. Smith in 
this case, claiming that he gave stock to some of. 
his creditors, who were members of his family, and 
offered stock to the plaintiff~ Nielson, the only 
other creditor still holding obligations against him. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that. regardless 
of the fact as to whether he had reallv intended to 
ultimately pay his creditors out by {neans of the 
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. 
. stock or otherwise, the transfer !operated to hinder 
and delay the creditors and the Court said that it 
was-
"clearly satisfied that the conveyance by 
Trebein of his property to the corporation 
was made to hinder and delay creditors, 
and should have been so declared by the 
(trial) court and ordered administered for 
the benefit of all his creditors, . . . '' 
The trial court had considered that Trebein had 
acted in good faith and gave judgment in his favor. 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, saying : 
" . . . The court found that this was all 
done in good faith. But, in view of the 
facts, we are unable to see how the court 
could have meant more than that he meant 
no wrong by it. Good faith in law, how-
;ever, is not to be measured always by a 
man's own standard of right, but by that 
which it has adopted and prescribed as a 
standard for the observance of all men in 
their dealings with each 'other. When one 
conveys all his property to another with 
the intention of hindering and delaying his 
creditors, or a part of them, in pursuing 
their legal remedies againit him and his 
property, his conduct in law is deemed 
fraudulent, however honestly he may nave 
intended to deal with all his creditors in 
the future.'' 
rbe Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 
Benton v. Minneapolis Tailg. & Mfg. Co., 
76 N.W. 265, said: 
''·We have already stated his financial 
condition and that his indebtedness largely 
'exceeded his assets. He must have in-
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tended the necessary consequences of his 
own acts. He transferred nearly all of the 
goods found in his wholesale store, and all 
of the fixtures therein contained, avail-
able personal property and about all he 
had, and he closed out the business pre-
viously carried on, and accepted as full 
payment stock shares in a corporation 
which was nothing but an experiment and 
which shares had no market value what-
soever. He converted his available per-
sonal property into that which was much 
less available for the payment of his in-
debtedness; and the transaction had a direct 
and immediate tendency to hinder, delay 
and defraud his creditors. Further than 
this, it was admitted that, of the stock issued 
to McLeod, in payment of the property, 
h~ immediately turned over shares of the 
par value of $5,000 in payment of a note 
for the amount held against him by his 
mother-in-law, Mrs. Pratt and that soon 
afterwards he pledged the balance of his 
shares - par value $4,600.00 - with de'" 
fendant Ellison as security for a loan of 
$1500.00 made by the latter to him. . . . 
That he pledged shares having a par value 
of more than three times the amount of 
money borrowed and that Ellison required 
such a pledge, indicate quite clearly that 
these gentlemen did not have a very exalted 
opinion of the real value. of shares in de-
fendant corporation. Taking into con-
sideration all of the circumstances as they 
were shown on the trial . . . it is very 
plain that McLeod and Pratt, at least, en-
tered into a conspiracy to hinder, delay 
'and defraud McLeod's creditors, organ-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
ized the corporation, having that intent 
and purpose in mind, and then to complete 
and consununate the fraud caused the 
g·ood~ and fixtures to be transferred to it, 
and the stock shares to be issued in pre-
tended payment. These facts justified the 
finding on which "Was rested the order for 
judgment against :McLeod, Pratt and the 
corporation.'' 
In the case at bar John W. Smith transferred 
every vestige of property of every nature which 
he had, including hi~ horses, cows, farm tools, and 
everything, the same as McLeod had transferred 
his furniture and fixtures previously used in hh; 
tailoring business. John W. Smith continued to 
!ive upon and occupy the property as his home, the 
same as he had done previous to the forming of 
the corporation, just as McLeod after the forming 
of his corporation continued to do his tailoring 
business in the Minneapolis store he had operated 
previously. The only conclm·•ion that can possibly 
be reached in the case at bar is that the defendant 
Smith did a farming business prior to the incor-
poration and, after the formation of the Smith Land 
Company, John W. Smith continued to do the farm-
ing business the same as he had done before. It 
was simply John W. Smith doing the same busines~ 
after having attempted to put on a new coat. That 
this is true is further emphatically borne out by 
the fact that in Smith's own testimony he stated 
that he was heavily indebted, his creditors were 
pressing him, and he could not go on, and that he 
formed the corporation to enable him to go on and 
work out. It is further borne out by the fact that 
immediately after the forming of the corporation, 
lw allowed itf; charter to be forfeited for non-
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payment of the franchise tax. This testimony is 
very clear and shows, beyond any doubt, that 
Smith's only purpose in forming a corporation was 
to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors in the 
collection of their just claims. 
Another case which is very instructive on the 
points in issue, is the case of 
Matchan v. Phoenix Land Investment Com-
pany, 198 N.W. 417. 
The judgment of the trial court .was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court, which stated: 
'''Where a corporation has been organized 
and used as an instrument of fraud ; 
where as here, an individwal has incor-
porated himself in order to hinder and, if 
possible defraud creditors, courts will go 
,as far as necess1ary in disreg1arding the 
corporation and its doings in order to 
accomplish justice. Such a corporation is 
a mere parasitic growth, a mass of fungus,, 
which will be lopped off clean whenever 
necessary to sound results. i 
''The fraudulent organizer of a corpora-
tion, intending to conceal his property 
from his creditors, cannot disinfect and 
immunize his work by admitting to its ex-
pected benefits one or more favored ones 
among his creditors. The corporation does 
not rid itself of guilt or its results simply 
by admitting one or· more innocent stock-
holders. Tha.t would indeed be an easy 
and convenient method of perpetrating 
fnaud. It is not permissible on any g'round. 
Wrongdoers cannot escape justice simply 
because their associates are not all b.ad." 
(Italics ours.). 
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We direct the attention of the Court, .without 
further comment, to the following cases: 
Colo. Trading Co. v. Acres Comm. Co., 70 
Pac. 954. · 
Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 48 Pac. 
587. 
National Bank v. Havens, 156 Atl. 645. 
Harris v. First National Bank, 149 South-
ern 86. · , 
Lawton v. Allard Realty Co., 168 South-
ern 768. 
Alliance Trust Co. v .. Streater, 161 South-
ern 168. 
Pittsmont Copper Co. v. O'Rourke, 141 
Pac. 849. 
Bennett v. Minott, 44 Pac. 288. 
Paxton v. Paxton, 15 P. (2d) 1051; 80 
Utah 540. . 
Zuniga v. Evans, 48 P. (2d) 513; 85 A.L.R. 
133; 87 Utah 198. · 
Johnson v. Cook, 146 N .W. 343 (Mich-
igan). 
Bourgeois v. Risley Real Estate Comp~ny 
88 Atl 199 (New Jersy). ' 
Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U~ S. 348; 77 L. 
Ed. 355. 
Planters & ~liners Bank v. Willeo Cotton 
Mills, 60 Ga. 169. · 
Kurran v. Rothschild,. 60 Pac. 1111. 
Buell v. Rope, 39 N.Y. Sup. 475. 
~· ' . . 
·we shall next discuss the homestead exemp-
tion. The courts generally have gone to the full ex-
tent in recognizing and protecting the homestead 
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exemption granted by the Constitution and the stat-
utory proceeding for working it out. : 
We assert at the outset that the court here in 
this decree has given proper consideration and pro-
tection to whatever homestead rights exist. In 
order to get clearly before us the manner in which 
this question is presented, it is necessary to refer 
back briefly to the facts and the findings. 
ere can be no claim that notice was given 
by reco ing the articles, by analogy to our record-
ing statute 
Sections -1-6 and 78,3, 2, Revised Stat-
utes of 3, 
because these sectio refer to conveyance of real 
estate which, when ack wledged and recorded, im-
part notice and provide t t ''subsequent purchas.-
ers, mortgagees and lien ho ers shall be deemed 
to purchase and take with noti . '' 
The action was originally brought as a bill in 
:equity to set aside the transfer as fraudulent and 
;void. 
When the defendant, John W. Smith filed his 
petition in bankruptcy and the adjudication was 
made and the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, 
was appointed trustee, ·Wilse A. Nielson ceased to 
be an actor in that proceeding. All property rights 
of the bankrupt passed to the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy. For a full discussion of the rights of a 
trustee in bankruptcy in such case we direct the 
Court to a consideration of 
Farkas v. Katz, 54 Fed. (2d) 1061: 
''By the challenged transfer, the bankrupt 
reserved a substantial benefit to himself; 
the transfer resulting in his retaining 
complete control of the transferred assets 
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and the beneficial owner~hip of a. 98 per-
cent interest in them. A neces&ary t>ffect 
of the transfer was to hinder or delay 
creditors by putting the transferred assets 
beyond the reach of legal process ·in theit· 
faFo·r. The bankrupt is presumed to have 
intended the necessary or ordinary con-
sequences of his intentional act. The trans-
action bei:ug in substmwe a transfer by the 
bankrupt to himself of substantially all his 
assets, and it being presumed that the bank-
rupt and the porporation dominated by 
himself intended to hinder or delay the 
former's creditors, the conclusion follows 
that the transfer was fraudulent and void-
able at the instance of a creditor who did 
not consent to it or of the truste-e in bank-
ruptcy when he is appointed. 
J. I. Kelley Co. v. Pollock & Bernheimer, 
57 Fla 459; 49 So. 934; 131 Am. St. 
Hep. 1101. 
First Nat. Bank v. F. C. Trebein Co., 59 
Ohio St. 316; 52 N.E. 834. 
13 R. C .L. 480, 543 " 
Also 
Volume I, Fletcher Cyc. Corporation Perm. 
Edition, page 166, paragraph 44: 
''Instances abou..Tld where fraudulent trans-
fers to the hindrance of corporate creditors 
were set aside or held invalid, some to rab-
ricated or controlling corporations, on the 
strength of this general principle (dis-
cussing the proposition that couzts will dis-
regard the corporate entity where necessary 
to prevent fraud) .... Thus where a cor-
poration is organized or maintained as a 
device in order to evade an outstanding 
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legal or equitable obligation, the courts, 
even without reference to actual fraud, re-
fuse to regard it as a corporate entity.'' 
Citing numerous cases. 
In this same volume at page 48 of the Supple-
ment, are gathered numerous cases and reference 
is made to an interesting article on this subject in 
32 Michigan Law Review, at page 551. 
We quote the following from the Supplement: 
'"Corporation formed to defraud creditors. 
'Where the corporate form is used by an 
individual for the purpose of evading the 
law, or for the perpetration of a fraud, 
courts will not permit the legal entity to 
be interposed so as to defeat justice.' 
Trachman v. Trachman, 117 N.J. Eq. 167; 
175 Atl. 147." 
The following cases consider the rules as to 
ignoring the corporate entity under such circum-
stances. 
Isaacson v. Union Trust Company, 275 
Pac. 529. 
Adams v. Morgan, 52 Pac. (2d) 643. 
MoRier v. Lee, 261 Pac. 35. 
Security ·Warehouse Company v. Hand, 
206 U.S. 415; 51 L. Ed. 1117. 
Brown v. Kossove et al, 255 Federal 806_. 
Childs v. Stees, 293 Federal 826. 
The bankrupt failed and refused to schedule 
this property or any interest in it and failed and 
refused to claim in his schedules any homestead 
exemption in the property. Under the author-
ities, he thereby waived the homestead right entire-
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ly. We direct the Court's attention to the follow-
ing: 
7 Corpus Juris, page 357, Section 627: 
'' ( 627) 9. Claim of Exemption - a. N eces-
sity for. The bankrupt must affirmatively 
claim his exemptions in order to be entitled 
ihereto in the bankruptcy proceedings.'' 
.Citing cases. 
In re Webb, 219 Federal 349. 
In re Barklaw, 282 Federal 892. 
In re Moran, 105 Federal, 901: 
'• Const. Va., Art. 11, Sec. 1, relating~ to 
homestead exemptions, provides that every 
householder or head of a family, 'shall be 
entitled . . . to hold exempt from levy,' 
etc .. property, real or personal, not exceed-
ing in value $2,000. HELD, that such pro-
vision merely gives the debtor a privilege 
of exemption, and does not create an abso-
lute exemption of any particular property, 
which will prevent the title to such property 
from vesting in the debtor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy, under Bkr. Act 1898, Sec. 70a, where 
the exemption is not claimed in his sched-
ules.'' 
In re Baughman, 183 Fed. 668. 
In re Friedrich, 100 Fed. 284. 
Notwithstanding this, however. after Nielson had, 
·in. effect, ceased to be the plaintiff and all rights had 
passed to Albert S. ·Wheelwright, the trustee, the 
defendant, John W. Smith, pleaded his homestead 
exemption right in this action, and presented evi-
dence to the effect that by reason of a dependent 
daughter living with him, he \Vas the head of a 
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excess of the homestead amount, was wholly im-
material on the trial of this case. 
We direct the Court's attention to the case of 
Crosby v. Anderson, 49 Utah 167; 162 
Pac. 75. 
fl'he Court said, at page 173 : 
''Moreover, under our statute, the apprais-
ed value of the homestead, if it is apprais-
ed, does not control as is the case in some 
jurisdictions, but, under Section 1162,. no 
bid can be considered and the homestead 
:cannot be sold unless the amount of the 
bid exceeds the exemption allowed by the 
statute, regardless of what the appraise-
ment may be." 
We further urge that the evidence conclusively 
shows that the property in ques,tion was of a value 
far in excess of the sum of $2300.00, the amount of 
exemption found. That is practically without, dis-
pute, though some argument is urged that the tes-
timonYi on this point goes to the value of the 
contract rather than to the value of the real es.tate. 
But we think, fairly considered, the evidence con-
clusively establishes that the property at the time 
in question was - over and above the balance duf~ 
on the purchase price- of a value far in excess of 
the homestead exemption amount. 
Under the finding1s and decree ample provision 
is made to fully protect the homestead rights of 
,John ·w. Smith, if the determination of the court 
that the corporation was but his alter ego and had 
no separate existence be overruled, but, on the other 
hand, and we think the decision· of the court is 
clt arly to this effect and supported by substantial 
e\ idence that the corporation was but the alter ego 
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of John W. Smith, had no separate existence and 
h~ continued in possession and ownerhip of all 
property interests under the contract to purchaRe 
ail.d must show the conditions existing now or at 
the time of the sale of the property as to his right 
to a homestead. .A.nd considering the facts in this 
light, he is now a single man, not the head of a fam-
ily and has no homestead exemptions under our 
statute. As to the procedure and the time of test-
ing the right and extent and mani;Ler of protecting 
the homestead exemption where the property in-
volved is of a \alue in excess of the homestead, we 
direct the Court's attention to the case of 
Thompson v. R€ynolds, 59 Ut~h 416; 205 
Pac. 516. 
Every homestead right that the defendant John 
"'·Smith has or that of the Smith Land Company 
as his granteE, if it is a corporate entity, can be 
fuJly protected by the proceeding provided by the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Our statute provides for full protection of ex-
isting homestead rights at the time of sale of the 
property on execution by the officer. 
Section 38-0-14, 15-16, Compiled Laws, 
1933: 
"38-0-14. "\Vhen Value Greater Than Ex-
emption. If the homestead selected is of 
greater value than is exempted under this 
title and consists of two or more separate 
pieces of land, the person entitled to the 
exemption may select which he will retain 
and which shall be partitioned or sold. If 
the debtor so elects, the homestead may be· 
sold. and after paying thP judgment debtor 
the value of the homestead the balance of 
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the money shall be applied on the judg-
ment.'' 
"38-0-15. Id. Sale on Execution. The 
homestead shall not be sold if the bid does 
not exceed the value of the exemption, 
when the homestead is in one piece; but if 
the homestead is in more than one piece, 
then the officer and the judgment debtor 
shall proceed as hereinafter provided to 
determine the value of each piece of prop-
erty claimed as exempt, and no piece shall 
be sold unless the bid therefor is~ greater 
than the appraised value thereof.'' 
'' 38-0-16. Id. Appraisal. If the officer 
having the execution and the person claim-
ing the exemption cannot agree as to the 
value of the homestead, or the partition 
thereof, the officer shall select one 
appraiser and the person cla.iming1 the ex-
emption another appraiser, both being 
householders of the vicinity, to whom the 
officer shall administer an oath to fairly 
and justly appraise and set apart the ex-
empt property concerning which there is 
a disagreement. In case of disagreement 
of the appraisers, they shall choo8~ a third 
person, who shall also be sworn, and the 
decision of any two such appraisers when 
made shall be final. The appraisers sliall 
report to the officer their appraisal of tlw 
property claimed as a homestead. If the 
person entitled elects to have the property 
partitioned, it shall he the duty of the 
appraisers to set apart such homestead as 
the person entitled shall select and be en-
titled to, and the property not set apart as 
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homestead shall be subject to sale under 
execution.'' 
Next in argument appellants urge estoppel. 
'l'his is a verr far-fetehed idea and we are unable 
to understand its application, in any sense, to this 
case. As above pointed out, the court has found 
that the Smith Land Company was the alter ego of 
John W. Smith, that it "Was a fictitious, non-existent 
entity, so far as this property was concer~ed, and 
used merelv as a convenience and contrivance to 
aid John \\;. Smith in completing his fraudulent in-
tent and purpose. But aside from this, where is 
there any basis for estoppel as applied to the Trus-
tee in Bankruptcy? Wilse A. Nielson testified, and 
this is without dispute, that he never heard of the 
corporation until just before he filed the action in 
1935. When the petition in bankruptcy was filed 
and the trustee appointed, Nielson ceased to have 
any interest in the matter, except in the form of a 
claim in the bankruptcy proceedlng. The full title 
and right vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcyr and 
as such he had no dealings with the company. The 
dealings between the company and C. D. Moore or 
the title holder of the property cannot affect the. 
Trustee in Bankruptcy and at the time Wilse A. 
Nielson purchased the title to the property and the 
right to receive the balance of the purchase price, 
be had no standing in the bankruptcy court, except 
as a creditor. He had no dealings with the cor-
poration and there is no representation or other 
basis for !invoking the doctrine of estoppel and 
further there is no element of change of position so 
far as the Smith Land Company is concerned, which 
would be any basis for estoppel. 
Certainly John W. Smith as found to De ~;uL-tv 
of the studied plan, purpose and intent and act of 
defrauding his creditors, is not in a position to 
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urge estoppel and neither Nielson or the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy received any benefits or gave any 
recognition to the corporation as a basis of estoppel 
as against them. In the brief counsel say that 
when Nielson served notice of intention to forfeit 
the contract, under the terms of the contract he 
thereby elected to treat the corporation as the owner 
of the property. This, we think, is very far-
fetched and of no significance at all because the 
notice wa.s served upon John W. Smith, it reading, 
(Exhibit 1): 
"To John W. Smith and to Smith Land 
Company, a corporation and to Albert S. 
Wheelwright, Trustee in Bankruptcy of 
John W. Smith, Bankrupt." 
And further we point out that Nielson, at this time, 
was in a position, in a sense, adverse to that of the 
Trrustee in Bankruptcy. We think it needs no cita-
tion of authority to sustain this position. 
The next point urged is that of the statute of 
limitations. Counsel, in their brief, base their wholr 
contention under this head, apparently on the fact 
that the plaintiff allegPd the issue of execution and 
its return unsatisfied, and do not make a. full state-
ment of the fact which is that th0. return of he 
sheriff was not made and was never signed by the 
aeputy who handled it and was not filed in court 
~and made a public record, even by the sheriff until 
after this suit was filed and on the 26th day of June, 
1937, as appears in the transcript, page 277. 
The uncontradicted evidence and the finding 
of the court is that there is no apparent change in 
the relation of John ·W. Smith to this property. It 
was known that he was buying it under a contract. 
The undisputed evidence is that Nielson never heard 
of the assignment or transfer of this contract: 
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which appeared nowhere except by way of recital 
in the articles of incorporation of Smith Land Com-
pany, of which the plaintiff, Nielson, had no knowl-
e<Ioooe until about the time the suit was filed and to 
which articles h~ was under no duty in any sense 
to look. It is true that knowledge of facts that 
would cause a reasonable man to make inquiry 
charges him with notice of what such inquiry 
would reveal. But nowhere in the evidence is there 
any basis for the application of this rule and there-
fore the authorities cited by counsel have no appli-
cation. Failing to find any evidence and a.nnarently 
in desperation to support their position, counsel in 
their brief, at page 31, boldly state: 
"It is inconceivable that in the circum-
stances Nielson did or could have closed 
his eyes to the facts which were apparent 
on every hand. Under the statute as con-
strued in the following cases the suit was 
barred.'' 
We ask, what circumstances? What facts 
were apparent on every hand to put Nielson on 
inquiry? We challenge counsel to point out in the 
1·ecord any such thing. Neither the circumstances 
nor facts exist that would warrant such statement. 
It is a mere explanation of hopeless prejudice on 
the part of the appellant in an effort to support his 
position and without findings of the court that 
knowledge or facts or circumstances pointing to 
knowledge exist. The question at issue is not 
whether the palintiff or Mr. Skeen had notice that 
the execution had been returned unsatisfied. The 
question involved in this case is whether or not 
the plaintiff had notice that the Smith Land Com-
pany had been organized and that the defendant 
John W. Smith had assigned his contracts and all 
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of his property to this corporation without ·any con~ 
sidera tion. 
There .is not a scintilla of evidence in the rec-
ord· to show. that the sheriff of Box Elder Countv 
ever learned that the contract has been assigned t~ 
this corporation ,or that Mr. Smith transferred hi~ 
property. 
There is not a s.cintilla of evidence that· thE' 
sheriff ever attempted to make any levy. This 
1Court knows, that it i~ not unusual for an execution 
to he issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff 
and for the sheriff to make demand for settlement 
1and upon ~he defendant's. r~fusal or neglect to pay, 
to return the execution and this is the usual pro-
ceedings in the absence of specific directions in 
writing to levy upon some particular property. 
There is no evidence that the executions which were 
is:;ued were any more than demand executions; no 
evidence that any demand was made to levy upon 
i:his particular property and evmi if there had been, 
thP evidence conclusively shows that the defendant 
John W. Smith immediately put up ·a supersedeas 
bond and had an order staying further execution , 
and further proceedings in the case pending an 
appeal to the Supreme Court, and that t:l}.e remit-
.titur from the Supreme Court affirming the judg-
ment did not .come do,vn until within three years 
prior to the filing of this action. The plaintiff, hav-
ing the supersedeas . bond, and thinking the judg-
ment would be paid, clearly had no duty to make any 
investigation or any attempt to collect on his judg-; 
ment further and, in fact, was restrained by court, 
order from doing so. 
Neither is there a scintilla of evidence in this 
record to show that the plaintiff, ·w. A. Nielson or 
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Mr. D. A. Skeen knew of the organization of the 
corporation nor of the transfer of the contract. 
They have both testified positively that they did 
not know of these facts. There is no contention 
that they had any constructive notice from the r~­
ords of Box Elder County. No transfer was re-
OC•rded. There was nothing in the filing of the ar-
·ticles of incorporation to even put them on inquiry. 
There is no statute which makes the filing of the 
articles notice and there can be no analogy to the 
general recording statute, Sections 78-1-6 and 
78-3-2, Revised Statutes of 1933, which statute pro-
vides that conveyances of real estate must be 
aclrnowledged and recorded and when recorded the 
record shall impart notice ''and subsequent pur-
chasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deem-
ed to purchase and take with notice.'' 
We submit that the argument of appellant on 
this point of the statute of limitations wholly fails 
and this point is of no consequence. There was sub-
stantial evidence in support of the allegation as to 
when the facts on which the fraudulent conveyance 
was based were learned and the court so found. 
This then completely answers defendants' argu-
ment on that point. 
Under the next heading "The Judgment As 
to Albert S. Wheelwright is Void,'' counsel for 
appellant seek to argue for A. F. Turley and appar-
ently predicate their whole case in this regard on 
the fact that A. F. Turley was substituted for 
Albert S. Wheelwright and therefore the court 
could not grant a judgment for Albert S. Wheel-
wright. The trustee, however, was not dismiss.ed 
out of the case, but continued through as a party 
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accordingly. 
Under the authorities it was~!cessary to sub-
stitute A. F. Turley for Wheelwright, his rights 
having accrued after the action was filed and the 
intervention made by Albert S. Wheelwright. The 
court proceeded with the case, apparently on this 
theory and concluded that Wheelwright was en-
titled to a judgment fixing the lien evidently on the 
theory that the rights of A. F. Turley would be 
(worked out through the Trustee in Bankruptcy. We 
refer the Court to the testimony too of Turley to 
the effect that he understood that if he did not get 
the property, he would get his money back from the 
Trustee in Bankruptcy, to whom he paid it It will 
be noted also that the trial court decreed the title 
;to the property in question in appellants, subject 
io the lien of the plaintiff's judgments and the bank-
ruptcy costs and expenses and gave to the Trustee 
in Bankruptcy a lien for this entire amount. Ob-
viously then if the Trustee in Bankruptcy acquired 
no title he did not convey title to Turley and Tur-
ley was not entitled to judgment but in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding would be entitled to have his. 
money refunded. But, aside from this, Turley has 
not appealed and this appellant may not challenge 
the judgment for him on this appeal. This Court, 
in the case of 
Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509; 261 P. 
450, page 516 
disposed of this point finally when it said: 
''The District Court, by its decree, re-
quired plaintiff to pay defendant all sums 
paid by him to Millard County and all 
sums paid by him in redemption of the 
drainage tax sale. No appeal is taken by 
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must conclude that he is satisfied with it. 
In any event, the question is not here for 
review, and we are not called upon to de-
termine whether that part of the judgment 
of the court was erroneous or not. We are 
simply holding that in this case, on the face 
of the record as reflected by the stipula-
tion, the defendant has not been injured by 
the decree of the court, and was denied no 
legal or equitable right in the judgment en-
tered.'' 
One other point urged, and we have above re-
ferred to it, we think with sufficient explanation, 
is that the court in working out equity and in order 
to protect the rights of Nielson to have his judg-
ments paid in full through the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy required that as a condition, the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy be given a lien, not only for the amount 
of the judgments with interest as determined, but 
for the amount of such costs as determined by the 
bankruptcy court, using the determination maae 
by the bankruptcy court as a yardstick in this pro-
ceeding. We submit that this is entirely proper 
practice and does not in any sense delegate any 
jurisdiction or function of the lower court, but 
takes as a fact a determination made by the bank-
ruptcy court as a basis for doing complete justic~ 
in this equity proceeding. 
Since this appeal was taken and the record 
made up the appellant has served a motion for an 
order authorizing the filing in this Court of a copy 
of an order of the U. S. District Court in the mat-
ter of the bankruptcy of John W. Smith. We take 
this opportunity to resist such motion and object 
to the filing of any such order as not in accordance 
with any recognized practice or proceeding in this 
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Court and not in any sense binding upon this Court. 
and therefore wholly irrelevant and immaterial. 
The cases now before this Court on these appeals 
result from a full trial and final decision of the 
District Court and are here for review on the record 
of that trial only. 
We respectfully submit that the motion should 
be denied and the judgments of the trial courf 
should be in all respects affirmed and this litigation 
brought to an end. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEROY B. YOUNG, 
D. A. SKE,EN, 
_;(_~ll-.~ 
4 .. fl~.~····· 
.a .... 9:t .... ~ .... 
A. U. MINER, 1. ; 
Attorneys for Respondent ·W. A. Nielson, 
and Albert S. Wheelwright, Trustee in 
Bankruptcy of John W. Smith, Bankrupt. 
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